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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78A-3-102(3)(A).
ISSUES
1.

Was the coverage question "fairly debatable" as a matter of law? This

issue was presented and fairly included in the first question presented for review
in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals'

decision for correctness. 111 ''The correctness of the court of appeals' decision huns
on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review." 2 "Summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law .... Whether an insured' s claim is fairly debatable
under a given set of facts is also a question of law. However, ... the fairly-debatable
defense should not be resolved through summary judg1nent if reasonable minds
could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard
1.
omitted).
2

Utah v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 1[ 7, 106 P.3d 729 (internal quotations

State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, <JI 7, 95 P.3d 276 (citing Newspaper Agency
Corp. v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)).
1

required for insurance claim investigations .... Furthermore, summary judgment
should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable
probability that the party n1oved against could prevail." 3
2.

Were there genuine issues regarding the reasonableness of the

insurer's conduct in this case? This issue was presented and fairly included in the
second question presented for review in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Standard of Review: "We begin with the well-recognized statement that in

a summary judg1nent proceeding, all facts and the reasonable inferences to be
made therefrom should be construed in a light favorable to the non-moving party.
In some cases, the parties 1nay agree on the objective statement of the facts, but
may fundamentally disagree on the reasonable inferences to be made from those
facts .... Even if the moving party's objective statement of the facts [is] agreed
upon, reasonable inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create
a genuine issue of material fact." 4

3
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2012 UT 52, <J[<Jl 1, 6, 8, 286 P.3d 301
(internal quotations, citations omitted).
4
USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, <_II 33, 235 P.3d 749 (citation
omitted).
2

3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Oltmanns Rule

56(£) relief? This issue was fairly included in the second question presented for
review in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Standard of Review: "We review the denial of a rule 56(f) motion for an
abuse of discretion. We will not reverse the district court's decision to grant or
deny a rule 56(f) n1otion for discovery unless it exceeds the limits of
reasonabili ty. " 5
DETERMINATIVE RULES

UTAH R. CIV. PROC. 56(C), (E)-(F) (Addendum 1 hereto).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Courts
Below.
1. Declaratory Judgment Action

Brady Blackner was seriously injured while being towed by a Honda
AquaTrax that was operated by his cousin-in-law, Robert Allen Oltmanns. (R. 2,
14). Blackner filed action for personal injuries against Oltmanns, and others, in

5
Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, <JI 20, 192 P.3d
858 (internal quotation, citations omitted).
3

Farmington District Court. (R. 2, <jl5). At the time, Oltmanns and his wife were
insured by Fire Insurance Exchange under a policy of homeowner' s insurance. (R.
2, <]l6). Oltmanns tendered defense of the action to Fire Insurance. (R. 2, <j[7).
Fire Insurance did not accept the tender. Instead, it filed this action for
declaratory judgment taking the position that there was no coverage. (R. 3, <jll0).
In the meantime, Fire Insurance asked counsel to continue representing Oltmanns
at his own expense. (R. 558).
Before discovery was taken, Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment.
(R. 29). The motion was filed on the basis of the following exclusion:
We do not cover bodily injury, ... which

7.

results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of: ...
c.

jet skis and jet s.leds 6 or

d.

any other watercraft owned or rented to an insured and
which: (1) has more than 50 horsepower inboard or
inboard-outdrive motor power; .... (RR. 598-99)
(en1phasis in original).

No one argued that the Honda Aqua Trax was a "jet sled." Fire Ins.
Exchange v. OUnwnns, 2012 UT App 230, <JI 10 n.3, 285 P.3d 802.

6

4

There was no disputing that the Honda AquaTrax was a sit-down version
of a personal watercraft with an inboard "135-horsepower ... engine." (RR. 44-45).
However, it was neither owned by, nor rented to, Oltn1anns. (R. 6, <J[4). Therefore,
Subparagraph (d) was inapplicable. Rather, Fire Insurance contended that the
Aqua Trax was a "jet ski," and subject to the exclusion in Subparagraph (c).
Fire Insurance clain1ed that Subparagraph (c) applied to "any jet ski." (R.
32). Specifically, it contended that Jet Ski had become "a genericized term for any
type of personal watercraft." (R. 34, <J[9). The insurer found support for this in
Wikipedia. (R. 57). However, the same entry also noted that "Jet Ski is the brand
name of personal watercraft (PWC) rnanufachued by Kawasaki Heavy
Industries." (emphasis in original). This was not all: "Jet Ski ... can also refer to
versions of PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as 'stand-ups."'
Fire Insurance's Wikipedia authority stressed this latter definition: "'Jet Ski'
became foren1ost the colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft, because in
1973 Kawasaki was responsible for a limited production of stand-up models .... "
(R. 57) (emphasis added). This was followed by a table showing that the Jet Ski

trademark was generic for "Stand-up personal watercraft." (R. 62).

5

Fire Insurance settled on the one - and only - definition that supported its
claim and contended that the policy "clearly and unambiguously excludes
coverage for any jet ski, and not just the 'Jet Ski®' brand .... " (R. 32). It dismissed
Subparagraph (d), which had application to all makes and models of watercraft,
with the argument that it did not contain the word "personal." (R. 178). Summary
judgment was granted on these bases. (R. 181 ).
Oltmanns and Blackner appealed (Case No. 20100462-CA). The appeal was
decided on August 16, 2012. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230,285
P.3d 802. The court ruled that Subparagraph 7(c) was "ambiguous as a matter of
law." Id., at 1[ 10. Based on Wikipedia, "at least one additional interpretation [of
jet ski] is entirely possible." Id., at 'f[ 9. "Did [the insurer] mean all manner of
personal watercraft? Or did it 1nean only the stand-up variety?" Id., at 1[ 10.
"Because the exclusionary provision is ambiguous, it must be construed
against the drafter, and thus the language relied on by the insurance company is
not effective to exclude coverage for an insured' s accident resulting from use of
an AquaTrax personal watercraft of the sit-down variety." Id., at ~I 11. The

6

judgment of the district court was reversed and the case "remanded for trial or
such other proceedings as may now be in order." Id.
Fire Insurance proceeded to settle the Blackner case. (R. 228, 114). It, also,
reimbursed Oltmanns for his fees defending the Blackner case. (Id., at 115).
However, Fire Insurance "refused, despite demand, to pay Defendant Oltmanns
for his attorney's fees prosecuting this coverage action and the successful
appeal."(Id., at 116).
2. Counterclaim for Breach of the Implied Covenant

On January 9, 2013, Oltmanns filed a Counterclaim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 226). Specifically, he alleged
that Fire Insurance "did not fairly evaluate the [Blackner] claim, and unreasonably
rejected it, .... " (R. 228, 121). 7 The claim was for "attorney's fees for prosecuting
this coverage action and the successful appeal." (Id., at 122).
On January 24, 2013, Oltmanns filed a First Amended Counterclaim (R. 244)
adding a claim for breach of the insurance contract. (R. 246). Leave to file the First

7

See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
7

Amended Counterclaim was granted. (R. 309). Fire Insurance's response was a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 352), which was denied. (R. 398).
As part of the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (R. 398), Oltmanns was required to make a more definite statement of
his counterclaim, which he did in the Second Amended Counterclaim filed on
September 30, 2013. (R. 403). The parties proceeded to discovery, which included
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (RR. 458, 464, 484).
On May 30, 2014, Fire Insurance moved, a second time, for summary
judgment. (R. 494). The motion was based, in principal part, on the Affidavit of
Shawn L. Stephens (R. 537), Litigation Claims Specialist for Fire Insurance. (Id., at
<_1[2). Stephens is the one who investigated the Blackner claim. (R. 538, 13). 8

Stephens secured the basic pleadings in the Blackner case, a copy of the
Rental Agreement, and Oltmanns' deposition. (RR. 538-39, 19). After meeting
8
Stephens originally characterized his investigation as "thorough." (R.
538, <JIS). Objection was made that this was "conclusory" since there was nothing
to indicate what was a "thorough" coverage investigation. (RR. 665-66, <_1[18).
Accordingly, the characterization was withdrawn. (R. 867, ~[18) (Addendum 3
hereto). However, the characterization continued to appear in Fire Insurance's
pleadings. (R. 738).

8

with his supervisors, the decision was made "to send this matter to outside
counsel for a coverage opinion." (R. 539, 1111). Other than a request for the vehicle
registration (R. 558), which was never received, this was the sum total of the
factual investigation.
The coverage letter (R. 560) (Addendum 5 hereto) was simply filed with the
exhibits to the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
518). There was nothing authenticating the physical exhibit. Stephens was the
source for the factual statement in the Memorandum in Support (R. 503, 123), but
all he said was: "I received the coverage opinion .... " (R. 540, 114) (emphasis
added).
To be clear, an affidavit of coverage counsel was not included. As a result,
Stephens is the one who published the contents of the letter: "Based on his
research regarding the term 'jet-ski,' [counsel] believed that we had a 75% chance
in prevailing in a declaratory relief action." (R. 540, <J[14).
However, Oltmanns did not object on the basis of authentication: "The
statement [<Jl23, Statement of Undisputed Facts] is inadmissible, and conclusory,
hearsay. It is based on the Affidavit of Shawn L. Stephens. (Exhibit D). However,

9

he was not the author of counsel's letter (Exhibit K), and there is no affidavit from
counsel. As a result, there is no support for the statement, other than counsel's
letter, .... " (R. 666, 1{23) (emphasis added).
In its Reply Men1orandum, Fire Insurance confused the authentication
requirements vvith the hearsay rule: "The statement is based off of Shawn
Stephens understanding of the coverage opinion .... Thus, the statement is not
hearsay as it is based on the first hand knowledge and understanding of Shawn
Stephens." (R. 732, 'f[23).
At the summary judgment hearing, Fire Insurance changed tack and
argued that the letter was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. UTAH R.
Evm. 801(c)(2). This was the basis for the trial court's ruling:

[T]his Court finds that statement ["Fire Insurance had a 75% chance
in prevailing in a declaratory relief action"] is based upon the
underst,,nding of Shawn Stephens for Fire Insurance, as set forth in
his affidavit. The Court concludes that the statement of fact is not
hearsay because receiving the coverage opinion from coverage
counsel, ... was part of the process of investigating the facts of the
accident and fairly evaluating the claim.
R. 868, <j{23 (Addendum 3 hereto).

10

As a result, Fire Insurance certified the reasonableness of its own conduct.
It is not hard to see why this ruling was made, particularly, when Fire Insurance

argued before the trial court that "the conduct and analysis of coverage
counsel.. .is not at issue." (R. 737, <jl2) (emphasis added).
According to Fire Insurance, the quality of the coverage opinion did not
matter. It was enough that Fire Insurance had a coverage opinion justifying the
filing of an action for declaratory judgment. And yet, Fire Insurance continued to
assert the "75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief action" (R. 567). At the
same time denying that the basis for the opinion was relevant.
Fire Inst~rance's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on September
24, 2014. The Order Granting Summary Judgment was entered on October 10,
2014. (R. 863) (Addendum 3 hereto). Appeal was filed on October 20, 2014. (R.
876) (Appellate Case No. 20140984-CA).
The order was affirmed on appeal. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT
App 54, ':II 16, 370 P.3d 566 (Addendum 2 hereto). This judgment is the subject of
the present appeal.

11

B.

Statement of Facts

Very few facts were relevant to the coverage decision. Therefore, most of
the Statement of Undisputed Facts (R. 499) was immaterial. Oltmanns
controverted those few statements he deemed material. For example, 1118: "Fire

Insurance began a thorough coverage investigation and evaluation regarding the accident
in [uly of 2006 that involved Oltmanns." (R. 502).
As noted above (pg. 8 n.8), Oltmanns argued this was "nothing but a
conclusion that is unsupported by the facts." (R. 665, <j{18). There was nothing to
indicate what would be a "thorough coverage investigation." Accordingly, Fire
Insurance withdrew the characterization, and this was accepted by the trial court.

(R. 867, 'fil8) (Addendum 3 hereto). 9
Fire Insurance was content to leave the matter as follows: "Fire Insurance
conducted an investigation and followed the necessary steps required by Fire
Insurance Exchange." (R. 731, '1118). This, of course, was entirely different. There
was no disputing that Fire Insurance conducted son1e kind of investigation.

9
Though, as we stated above (pg. 8 n.8), it continued to appear in the
pleadings. (R. 738).

12

Even so, Fire Insurance felt the need to re-characterize the testimony of its
witness (Shawn Stephens):
• When a claim is made under a policy of insurance issued by Fire
Insurance Exchange, we conduct an investigation.
• As part of this investigation, the initial step is to ensure the
applicable insurance policy was in effect at the time the loss
occurred.
• Thereafter, we review the insuring agreement and the definitions
contained in the insurance policy.
• A review of the exclusions and conditions and their relation to the
loss is then done to determine if the loss is a covered occurrence
and t0 determine if the person seeking coverage qualifies as an
insured.
• If we have a coverage question regarding the language of an
insuring agreement, we often refer the matter to outside counsel
to provide a coverage opinion. We rely on outside counsel to
assist in making a coverage determination.

• Fire Insurance Exchange followed this process when we
conducted an investigation relating to the accident that occurred
that is the subject of this matter.
RR. 730-31, 1[18.

Most of this was not at issue. For example, there was no question that Fire
Insurance relied, principally (if not exclusively) on the opinion of outside counsel.

13

In fact, what appears to have been most significant was counsel's statement of "a
75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action." (R. 540, <][14).
However, there was one glaring omission. In the" Analysis of Coverage,"
there was no mention of "defense." There was never any explanation for Fire
Insurance's failure to assume the defense of the Blackner action even though the
tender was plainly acknowledged. (R. 561) (Addendum 5 hereto).
Counsel, also, acknowledged: "Under Utah law, a liability insurance
carrier's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify." (R. 565). However,
counsel merely recommended the filing of a declaratory judgment action. (R. 567)
(Addendum 5 hereto): "It would be dangerous to simply deny coverage because
Mr. Blackner and Mr. Oltmanns may enter into an agreen1ent to stipulate to a
large judgment and Mr. Oltmanns could then assign his claims against Fire
Insurance [E]xchange to Ivlr. Blackner." (Id.)
However, counsel never advised against assuming the defense of the

Blackner action. Fire Insurance made this decision, entirely, on its own. Fire
Insurance has argued - repeatedly - that it did not reject the tender. However, it

14

never assumed the defense; not at least, until after ruling by the Court of
Appeals. For this, Fire Insurance got no protection from the coverage opinion.
Fire Insurance, basically, acknowledged this: "[T[he coverage opinion is
relevant only to the issue of Fire Insurance's decision to file a declaratory
judgment action, not its ultimate success or failure." (RR. 739-40) (emphasis
added). Evidently, Fire Insurance did not consider that it could file for declaratory
judgment and provide a defense for Oltmanns - at the same time.
There was more to Oltmann's objection (R. 666): "Further, there is evidence
that Plaintiff's investigation was less than 'thorough.' See Statement of Additional
Facts, <j{l." Statement of Additional Facts No. 1 was as follows:
Before sending the claim for a coverage evaluation, [Fire Insurance]
determined that it needed "a copy of the vehicle title and registration
at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is
classified." [Fire Insurance] wanted to know if the vehicle were
classified as a "watercraft." [Fire Insurance] thought this may "affect
coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy." [Fire Insurance]
conceded: "This information is needed before sending out for
coverage opinion [sic]." However, the vehicle title and registration
were not secured. Fire Insurance Exchange's Answer to Interrogatory
No. 1 (Exhibit 1 hereto). It is clear that Utah titles and registers
"personal watercraft." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-18-2(16); Vessel
Application for Utah Title (TC-656V).
RR. 667-68, 1{1.

15

As previously noted (pg. 9), this is what remained of Fire Insurance's
investigation, which it never completed:
Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said information prior to
sending the matter out for a coverage opinion .... It was determined
that the identified information would be helpful, but it was not felt to
be critical. If coverage counsel felt the information was essential for a
coverage opinion, additional efforts to obtain said information
would have been made.
R. 735.

Even though Fire Insurance admitted that the vehicle registration may
"affect coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy," and the information
was "needed before sending out for coverage opinion," the trial court deemed it
to be of no significance. Therefore, ~[18 was declared to be "undisputed." (R. 867,
'1[18) (Addend um 3 hereto).

Oltmanns, also, controverted <fi23: "Based on {counsel's] research regarding the

term "iet-ski," {he l believed thnt Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a
;

declaratory reli~faction." (R. 666, '1[23). As noted above (pg. 9), Oltn1anns objected
that the statement was inadmissible hearsay: "It is based on the Affidavit of
Shawn L. Stephens. (Exhibit D). However, he was not the author of counsel's

16

letter (Exhibit K), and there is no affidavit from counsel. As a result, there is no
support for the statement, other than counsel's letter, .... " (Id.)
Fire Insurance's response showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the
hearsay rule: "The statement is based off of Shawn Stephens understanding of the
coverage opinion sent to him ....Thus, the statement is not hearsay as it is based on
the first hand knowledge and understanding of Shawn Stephens." (R. 732, <Jl23).
We have seen how Fire Insurance avoided objection with this argument:
Fire Insurance responded that the statement was not offered for "the
truth of the matter asserted." UTAH R. EVID. 801(c)(2). However, this
Court finds that statement is based upon the understanding of
Shawn Stephens for Fire Insurance, as set forth in his affidavit. The
Court concludes that the statement of fact is not hearsay because
receiving the coverage opinion from coverage counsel, ... was part of
the process of investigating the facts of the accident and fairly
evaluating the claim. Thus, Oltmanns' response creates no genuine
issue of material fact. As a result, this Court concludes that this
statement of fact is undisputed.
R. 868, CJ[23 (Addendum 3 hereto).

It is not hard to see why the trial court made this decision; particularly,
when Fire Insurance argued that "the conduct and analysis of coverage
counsel. . .is not at issue." (R. 737, <][2).
However, as before, there was more to the response:
17

[C]ounsel does not explain the "75%" coverage evaluation in his
letter. It appears to have been based on nothing but dictum from the
Florida case on which counsel, apparently, relied. In fact, there is no
way to reconcile the coverage evaluation with the actual ruling of the
Florida case. Further, there is no way to know whether - and if so, to
what extent - counsel applied the Utah rule of strict construction of
insurance policy exclusions. It does not appear that counsel
considered how his Wikipedia search of outside sources suggested
that the policy exclusion was ambiguous. It is certain he did not
consider how the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy pointed to a
narrower construction of the jet skis exclusion .... [I]f the Court is
inclined to grant the motion, Defendant OLTMANNS should be
granted leave to depose [coverage] counsel. See Declaration of
Donald L. Dalton, Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(£) (submitted herewith)
[Addendum 4 hereto]. See also Statement of Additional Facts, 1[2.
R. 666, 123.

If the opinion was admitted, there were inferences that needed to be drawn
from the "vague and conclusory nature of counsel's coverage letter." (R. 668, <j[2).
These were detailed in Statement of Additional Facts No. 2:
o

Counsel's opinion was based on dictum, not on the actual ruling of
the Florida case.

• Counsel did not credit that the supposedly "generic" definition of
jet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in the Florida case.
• Counsel did not credit that what made the policy exclusion
"unambiguous" was the addition of the language: "jet ski or
similar type of craft."

18

•

Counsel did not consider what the absence of that language, in
this case, meant to the construction of the policy exclusion.

•

At least, counsel attached undue significance to the dictum from
the Florida case; and did not give sufficient weight to the
difference in the policies considered in light of the Utah standard
of strict construction of insurance policy exclusions.

•

Counsel did not consider how his resort to extrinsic evidence
(Wikipedia search) suggested that jet ski was susceptible to
different interpretations.

•

Counsel gave no heed to the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy,
which suggested a narrower construction of jet skis. (Exhibit L, pg.
16, <JI7( d) [R. 599]).
RR. 668-69, <]l2.

Oltmanns was taking no chances with summary judgment. Even though
Fire Insurance failed to secure an affidavit of counsel, Oltmanns filed a
declaration of his counsel-plainly labeled under UTAH R. CIV. PROC. 56(F)arguing that coverage counsel's deposition should be taken. (R. 682) (Addendum
4 hereto). 10

10
At the hearing, Oltmanns, also, argued (to no effect) under UTAH R.
CIV. PROC. 56(E).
19

Fire Insurance 1noved to strike the declaration. (R. 764). However, the trial
court waved it away concluding that it did not raise any genuine issues.
Therefore, the motion was denied for being "moot." (R. 872).
Again, the trial court concluded that none of this raised any genuine issues.
Accordingly, <J[23 was "undisputed." (R. 868, <]!23) (Addendum 3 hereto).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

There was no good basis for filing the declaratory judgment action. It

was evident from the authority on which Fire Insurance relied (Wikipedia) that
"jet ski" had multiple definitions - only one of which supported the position it
took on coverage. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the Court of Appeals
ruled (3-0) the provision was "ambiguous as a matter of law." Long-standing case
authority, some of which was acknowledged by Fire Insurance's counsel,
indicated that because of the ambiguity, the policy exclusion would be strictly
construed against the insurer. There were no fachrnl issues regarding the validity
of the insurance clain1, and legal issues - such as, ambiguousness - do not make
for "fairly debatable" coverage questions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the decision of the trial court on summary judgment.
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2.

No matter what, Fire Insurance was not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. There is a clear and notable distinction between factual disputes
regarding the validity of the underlying insurance claim and what information
the insurance company used to deny the claim. There were no factual disputes
regarding the validity of the insurance claim. There were, however, significant
disputes regarding the information Fire Insurance used to deny the claim. Mainly,
the basis for the exaggerated prognosis of "a 75% chance of prevailing," which
was dictum from a Florida case that was completely inapplicable to this case.
These issues were waved away by the trial court - and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals - with the determination that the quality of the coverage opinion had no
bearing on the fairness of the coverage evaluation. It was enough for both of the
courts below that Fire Insurance had a coverage opinion - no matter how flawed.
3.

Again, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court refusal to

consider the inferences that were reasonably drawn from the "undisputed"
statements of fact. These inferences were identified by Oltmanns and presented to
the trial court in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and in a
plainly-labeled UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 56(F) declaration. Fire Insurance moved to
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strike the declaration, but the trial court ruled that the motion was "moot."
However, the questions raised by Oltmanns show that the "75% chance of
prevailing" was overstated. There was a failure to account for the ambiguity that
appeared, as a matter of law, on the face of the policy exclusion. This was
compounded by the failure of counsel to note the law of "strict construction" that
applies to insurance policy exclusions. It ended with counsel's reliance on a case
that actually supported acceptance of the tender. The trial court abused its
discretion in rejecting the Rule 56(f) declaration. Oltmanns raised genuine issues
of material fact that precluded entry of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE "TET SKIS" EXCLUSION WAS AMBIGUOUS AS A MATTER OF
LAW. THEREFORE, THE COVERAGE QUESTION WAS NOT FAIRLY
DEBATABLE.

In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "jet skis"
exclusion was ''ambiguous as a matter of law." 2012 UT App 230, at <j[ 10. "Even
discounting the bizarre possibility that [the insurer] meant to refer only to one
Kawasaki watercraft rnodet it still cannot be definitively said what the insurer
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intended: .... " Id. This was because "at least one additional interpretation [of "jet
skis"] is entirely possible." Id., at <JI 9.
The consequences were clear: "Because the exclusionary provision is
ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter, and thus the language relied
on by the insurance company is not effective to exclude coverage for an insured' s
accident resulting from use of an AquaTrax personal watercraft of the sit-down
variety." Id., at <JI 11.
It was conceded that "the facts are not in dispute and never have been;

instead, this case concerns a purely legal issue, i.e., whether the term 'jet ski' as
used in Oltmanns' s insurance policy was ambiguous as a matter of law." 2016 UT
App 54, at <]I 12. As a result, the trial court ruling was reviewed "for correctness,
according it n~ deference." Id., at <JI 9 (emphasis added).
There were no factual issues regarding coverage. The policy did not define
"jet skis," and Jet Ski® was a registered trademark of Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
which obviously did not apply to the Honda AquaTrax. Therefore, Fire Insurance
had to cast outside the policy for support that "jet ski" was a genericized term for
all personal watercraft.
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It found support for this in Wikipedia, but this was not the only definition.

The Wikipedia entry started with the following: "Jet Ski is the brand name of
personal watercraft (PWC) manufactured by Kawasaki Heavy Industries."
(emphasis in original). This was not all: "Jet Ski. .. can also refer to versions of
PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as 'stand-ups."'
In fact, the entry went on to say that '"Jet Ski' became foremost the
colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft, .... " (emphasis added). There
was even a tab.le at the back showing that the Jet Ski trademark was generic for
"Stand-up personal watercraft." It was undisputed that the Honda AquaTrax was
a sit-down version of personal watercraft.
Given the competing definitions, there was no getting around the
ambiguity of the "jet skis" exclusion. It seemed clear that the coverage question
could not be "fairly debatable'' - and certainly not as a matter of law.

It seems a rather open question whether legal issues - such as,
ambiguousness - can be "fairly debatable":
When making the determination of whether a claim is fairly
debatable, a judge should remain mindful of an insurer's implied
duties to diligently investigate claims, evaluate claims fairly, and act
reasonably and promptly in settling or denying claims. Only when
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there is a legitimate factual issue as to the validity of the insured' s
claim, such that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the
insurer's conduct measured up to the required standard of care,
should the court grant judgment as a matter of law.

Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, at <]I 12 (internal quotation,
citation omitted) (emphasis added).
There was none of that here, or in Jones:
Normally, the district court's conclusion would be entitled to some
deference. However, the district court based its ruling largely on the
legal conclusion that if the plaintiff could not prevail on summary
judgment, then summary judgment must be granted for the
defendant. ... This case therefore is n1ore like a traditional appeal from
a grant of summary judgment, which we review for correctness.
Id., at ']I 13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This gets to the heart of the matter because the Court of Appeals elevated
legal error to the status of a genuine factual dispute: "Finally, we find it very
persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire Insurance's theory and
argument in this case, i.e., in the first round of judicial consideration, not only was
there a debate, but Fire Insurance achially won the debate." 2016 UT App 54, CJ[ 13.
This cannot be the standard for judging insurer conduct. It is certain that
reasonable minds can differ on legal issues, but some questions are closer than
others. There may have been no justification for the trial court's decision. At this
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point, we would be substituting the quality of the judicial decision for the
reasonableness of the insurer's conduct.
An insurance coverage question cannot be "fairly debatable" just because
the trial court got it wrong in the first instance. Summary judgment is a legal
question. Therefore, if we accept that legal questions are "fairly debatable," there
would never be any basis for summary judgment, at least, not on insurance
coverage matters, so long as there was a question whether the standards for
summary judgment have been met.
There was no other justification for the court's ruling. The Court of Appeals
considered it "very relevant that courts, albeit in somewhat different contexts
than that presented in this case, have concluded that both' stand-up' and
'sit-down' watercraft may be considered jet skis." 2016 UT App 54, at <Jl 13.
However, neither of the cases helped.

Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4 th 755, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 (Cal.
App. 2006), was a products liability case that did not involve insurance coverage.
Even so, the California Court of Appeals clarified that the case involved a
"personal watercraft" and the sport of "jet skiing." Id., at 759 n.3.
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State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So.2d 1162 (Fla. App. 1992) is
the same case relied upon by Fire Insurance's coverage counsel. To say that it was
decided "in somewhat different contexts than that presented in this case," 2016
UT App 54, ciI 13, is an understatement
Even counsel admitted that the case was not an exact fit: "The Johnson case
is slightly different from the present case in that the State Farm policy excluded
coverage for a 'jet ski or similar type of craft,' while the Fire Insurance Exchange
policy excludes coverage just for a 'jet ski.

111

(emphasis added).

However, this was an absolutely crucial distinction. On this basis, the
Florida Court of Appeals ruled that the policy provision was unambiguous. 596
So.2d at 1164. The trial court record showed "that the Yamaha Wave Runner
[was], at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet Ski." Id.
There would have been no dispute in this case if Fire Insurance had used
such language. But counsel hu-ned away from this very important distinction and
just like the Court of Appeals, 2016 UT App 54,

<_[

13, seized on dictum from the

case: "The term 'jet ski' is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft
despite the fact that it is a registered trademark of Kawasaki." 596 So.2d at 1163.
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This was not the basis for the court's ruling. The court made the comment,
simply, to address the contention of the trial court that "State Farm should have
amended its policy to include the term 'personal watercraft' as defined in [Florida
statute]." Id. The court made clear that the supposedly "generic" definition of Jet
Ski was an inadequate basis for ruling.
But none of this saw the light of day. This was because the Court of Appeals
found further support for Fire Insurance's position in matters that were never
considered by coverage counsel. 2016 UT 54, <JI 16 n.4. Such as, changes to the
Wikipedia definition of Jet Ski after counsel's letter. Id., at<_[ 13.
It shouid not matter that Wikipedia - today- is n1ore favorable to Fire

Insurance's interpretation of "jet ski." The "sit-down/stand-up" distinction was
never very important to Oltmanns's case. Of more importance was the fact that Jet
Ski® is a registered trademark of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which still appears
in the Wikipedia entry cited by the Court of Appeals. 2016 UT App 54, <JI 13 n.3.
We do not believe that legal issues, which are reviewed for simple
correctness, are proper subjects for the "fairly debatable" standard. Just because
the trial court got the question wrong does not make the coverage question fairly
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debatable. Otherwise, there would be no end to what is fairly debatable, and the
insurer would have effective immunity from any claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

II.

THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO WHETHER FIRE
INSURANCE'S CONDUCT MEASURED UP TO THE REQUIRED
STAND ARD OF CARE.

A. The coverage opinion was fundamentally flawed. It was based on a case
that did not support the coverage position. Therefore, Fire Insurance's
reliance on it was not reasonable.
In Jones, the insurer took the position that genuine issues prevented
summary judgment in the insured's favor, which they probably did. However,
this did not make the coverage question fairly debatable as a matter of law:
There is a notable distinction between a factual dispute about the
validity of the underlying insurance claim and a factual dispute
about what information the insurance company used to deny the
claim. Mr. Jones alleges in his case that, based on the information
Farmers indisputably had, it should have granted his claim or
conducted further investigation before denying it. There is little
dispute about what information Farmers used to deny Mr. Jones's
claim. The disputed facts, therefore, involve the question of whether
Farmers' conduct measured up to the required standard of good faith
and fair dealing.

Jones, supra, at 1111 (emphasis added).
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The same is true here. We know, exactly, what information Fire Insurance
used to deny Oltmanns' claim. It was the coverage opinion of legal counsel. He
told the insurer there was "a 75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief
action." This - alone - should have given the insurer pause. For, if there was a
75% chance of prevailing in the declaratory judgment action, there was, at least, a
25% chance of failing, which (of course) the insurer did.
Whatever else, we know that the 75% prognosis was most significant in Fire
Insurance's reasoning of the matter. This was the basis for the decision to refuse
the tender and file declaratory judgment. However, Fire Insurance then took the
inexplicable position that the quality of the coverage opinion was "irrelevant" to
its decision.
There is no getting around the substance of the opinion unless the Court
accepts the argument that a coverage opinion - any coverage opinion - no matter
how flawed, is an absolute bar to clahn for breach, which we believe cannot be
done because the quality of the opinion is inseparable from the insurer's duty:
An analysis of whether an insurance claim is fairly debatable is
closely related to an analysis of whether an insurer fulfilled its
duty ... to evaluate the claim fairly. When making the determination
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of whether a claim is fairly debatable, a judge should remain mindful
of an insurer's implied duties to diligently investigate claims,
evaluate claims fairly, and act reasonably and promptly in settling or
denying claims.

Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, at <JI 12.
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2006 UT 20, 133 P.3d 428 was cited by
coverage counsel for the following: "If the policy provision is ambiguous, it will
be construed in favor of coverage." (R. 565). There is no telling how far counsel
went with this. It must be assumed that he read the following: "A contract may be
ambiguous because it is unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the
intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings." Id., at <]l 15 (internal quotation omitted).
Of course, there was more to this, which would have been recognized by

seasoned insurance counsel. (It should be noted that Fire Insurance's coverage
counsel was counsel for the insurer in Saleh.) Utah courts have been quite explicit
about the difference between insuring provisions and exclusionary clauses:
"[P]rovisions that limit or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against
the insurer." U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519,523 (Utah 1993).
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Counsel did not have to look very far for this. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
was cited as being in accord with Saleh: "Sandt' s test for ambiguity is worded
slightly differently but is functionally equivalent." 2006 UT 20, 1117 & n.l. Sandt
does seem to put a softer spin on the test for ambiguity in insurance cases: "It
follows that ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is
fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of
coverage." 854 P.2d at 522-23 (emphasis added).
Based on these rules of construction, "jet ski" would have to be seen as the
very definition of ambiguity. Counsel started by noting that '"Jet Ski® is a trade
name for Kawasaki." The coverage analysis should have stopped there - since the
watercraft was manufactured by Honda, not by Kawasaki. But counsel went on:
"The name (Jet Ski], however, has become a genericized trademark for any type of
personal watercraft." Now, there are two definitions, and here comes a third: "Jet
Ski. .. can also refer to versions of [personal watercraft] with pivoting handlepoles
known as 'stand-ups."'
There can be no denying that Jet Ski was fairly susceptible to different
interpretations, but this was not the worst of it. A most plausible definition
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appeared in the Wikipedia entry that was attached to the coverage opinion: "'Jet
Ski' became foremost the colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft,
because in 1973 Kawasaki was responsible for a limited production of stand-up
models .... " (e1nphasis added). 11
This may be why counsel resorted to case law, but even there, uncertainty
appeared: "Because of the unique language of the Fire Insurance Exchange policy,
we have not found the exact language .. .in any other cases which have addressed
the question of what constitutes a 'jet ski' for purposes of an exclusion under a
homeowners policy."
We have already examined the case on which counsel relied: State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Johnson, supra. It bears repeating that the issue came up later in

the same court. Thomas v. Prudential Property & Casualty, 673 So.2d 141 (Fla. App.
1996). Insurers were seen to have changed their policies to avoid the problems
with Jet Ski. "Watercraft" was found to apply, unambiguously, to all manner of
personal watercraft exceeding 50 motor horsepower. Id., at 142.

Indeed, there was a table attached to the Wikipedia entry, which was
part of the original summary judgment motion, showing that Jet Ski was generic
for "Stand-up personal watercraft."
11
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Thus, the hazard of the position Fire Insurance took in this case:
An objective assessment of the legal landscape evidences that LICOA
lacked a reasonable basis in law for disputing Pedicini' s claim to
benefits according to his interpretation of "actual charges." Under
clearly established Kentucky law, ambiguous contractual terms are
construed in favor of the insured. The term "actual charges" is
patently ambiguous; the use of the term in the supplemental policy is
hopelessly circular, as the term "actual charges" even appears within
its own definition in the policy ... .In light of these facts, LICO A
should have realized that unilaterally altering its definition of "actual
charges" was likely to result in legal claims against it by its
policyholders and that, under Kentucky law, LICOA would lack a
reasonable basis for denying those policyholders relief .... As a result,
it is difficult to see how LICOA can maintain that the proper
resolution of its dispute with Pedicini is fairly debatable as a matter
of law.

Pedicini v. Life Ins. Co. of Alabama, 682 F.3d 522, 529 (6 th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations, citations omitted).
As we have stated, there would have been no dispute if Fire Insurance had
used the language "or similar type of craft." The fact that language was missing
from the "jet skis" exclusion should have made all the difference. Instead, counsel
relied on dictum from the Florida case in rendering his opin~on. Presumably, this
is why the most he would say is "I believe we have a very strong argument.. .. "

34

Fire Insurance latched on to the statement: "I believe we have a 75% chance
of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." However, the basis for the calculation
was never explained. The higher figure may have had to do with counsel's failure
to note the "strict construction" of insurance policy exclusions. It may have been
the result of counsel's unsupported assertion that "a reasonable policyholder
would not see any difference between coverage for a Kawasaki jet ski or any other
brand of personal watercraft, .... "
Whatever the basis, the "75% chance" was way overstated. It started with
the failure to account for the ambiguity that appeared, as a matter of law, on the
face of the policy exclusion. It was compounded by the failure to note the law of
"strict construction" that applies to insurance policy exclusions. It ended with
reliance on a case that actually supported the acceptance of the tender; a case, at
least, that supported assumption of the insured' s defense. However, none of this
saw the light of day in the trial court.
B. To avoid operation of the hearsay rule, the coverage opinion was not
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.
When an insurer relies on the advice of counsel, as it did in this case, the
insurer has put the substance of the counsel at issue. In Utah, this is because the
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insurer is expected, as part of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
to diligently investigate the facts and fairly evaluate the claim, and then, act
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. See Beck v. Farmers Ins.

Exchange, supra, at 801.
There is nothing to suggest that the insurer's duty may be transferred to
legal counsel. If the insurer chooses to follow the advice of counsel, as it did in
this case, the reasonableness of its conduct becomes synonymous with the quality
of the counsel. Otherwise, there would be no basis for evaluating the insurer's
conduct. It would be the san1e as saying there was no basis for the insurer's
conduct.
Admittedly, Fire Insurance has, thus far, succeeded in avoiding
examination of the coverage opinion: "Fire Insurance did not offer the coverage
opinion to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the coverage opinion. Rather,
Fire Insurance offered the coverage opinion to show its effect on the hearer." 12
Fire Insurance has claimed that the coverage opinion was "relevant only to
the issue of Fire Insurance's good faith decision to file a declaratory judgment

12

Brief of Appellee at 27 (Case No. 20140984-CA).
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action, not the declaratory action's ultimate success or failure." 13 But there is no
explanation for how the insurer's "good faith" may be evaluated without
examining the coverage opinion.
Fire Insurance was able to convince the trial court to inquire no further than
the "75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action," but the trial court did
not accept the insurer's truth-of-the-matter argument (which was absurd), and
the trial court knew it, which is why it ruled: "[T]his Court finds that statement is
based upon the understanding of Shawn Stephen for Fire Insurance, .... "
But this means that Fire Insurance certified its own good faith. Fire
Insurance cannot have it both ways. Either, the coverage opinion is irrelevant,
which is what Fire Insurance has consistently argued; in which case, the trial
court erred by admitting any part of it. Or, the coverage opinion is perfectly
relevant for explaining why Fire Insurance did what it did; in which case, the trial
court erred by refusing to evaluate it.
Fire Insurance convinced the trial court not to inquire into the substance of
the admittedly qualified opinion based on Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002

13

Brief of A ppellee at 24.
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UT 68, 56 P.3d 524, and Callioux for Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App.
1987). For Fire Insurance, it was enough that it had a coverage opinion supporting
its decision to file for declaratory relief. According to the insurer, the claim was
"fairly debatable" because its counsel stated "a 75% chance of prevailing in a
declaratory relief action." It managed to convince the trial court that this was an
adequate basis for summary judgment.
The trial court concluded that Fire Insurance satisfied its duty to diligently
investigate, fairly evaluate, and reasonably refuse the tender of the claim with an
opinion of legal counsel. The trial court did not inquire about the substance of the
opinion because to do so would violate the hearsay rule. Therefore, the trial court
refused to consider the basis for the flawed conclusion that "we have a 75%
chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." There may as well have been
no basis for the decision.
C.

Counsel never ad vised against assuming defense of the Blackner action. In
this respect, Fire Insurance was acting, entirely, on its own without cover
from the legal opinion.
In light of the foregoing, it is easy to see how Fire Insurance breached its

duty by failing to assume defense of the Blackner action. Counsel acknowledged
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the tender of defense that went with the claim. He advised against rejecting the
claim outright. He advised that the duty to defend was "broader" than the duty to
indemnify. He, then, acknowledged the request that Oltmanns' counsel continue
representing him without guarantee of reimbursement. However, nowhere, did
he ad vise against assuming the defense.
What Fire Insurance got was a recommendation to file for declaratory
judgment. Fire Insurance argued over-and-over in the trial court that it had the
right to seek declaratory relief. No one contended otherwise. However, it never
occurred to Fire Insurance that it could argue the coverage question while at the
same time defending its insured. Fire Insurance has never suggested that it
satisfied this duty by asking Oltmanns' counsel to continue representing him
without guarantee of reimbursement. Oltmanns was facing personal liability of
several hundred thousand dollars. 14 Oltmanns had to spend the next several
years defending the personal injury action while, at the same thne, litigating with
his insurance company - on his own dime.

14

Blackner's claim was settled for the policy limit of $300,000.00.
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Fire Insurance was within its rights to file for declaratory relief. For this, it
had the advice of counsel. However, in all other respects, it breached its duty. A
fair evaluation of the claim would have shown that the "jet skis" exclusion was
unenforceable. A diligent investigation would have shown that the "jet skis"
exclusion was not even applicable. A reasonable response would have been to
assume defense of the Blackner action.
There is no way that Fire Insurance can be seen as having satisfied those
duties, as a matter of law, by leaving Oltmanns to fend for himself - for three (3)
long years - against the Blackner action. In this respect, Fire Insurance was acting
entirely on its own without the cover of legal counsel. Its duties, both contractual
and implied, were breached by this alone.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING THE
RULE 56(£) DECLARATION.

Oltmanns was taking no chances with summary judgment. Even though he
thought the motion would fail based on the inferences that should have been
drawn from the undisputed facts that appeared in the record, he argued that
genuine issues precluded entry of judgment as a matter oflaw. Accordingly, he
controverted the two pdncipal staten1ents of fact in Fire Insurance's motion:
40

Paragraph 18: "Fire Insurance began a thorough coverage investigation and

evaluation regarding the accident in luly of 2006 that involved Oltmanns."
Paragraph 23: "Based on {counsel's l research regarding the term ",iet-ski," {hel

believed that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory reli~f action."
Oltmanns controverted <J[18 with Statement of Additional Facts No. 1:
Before sending the claim for a coverage evaluation, [Fire Insurance]
determined that it needed "a copy of the vehicle title and registration
at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is
classified." [Fire Insurance] wanted to know if the vehicle were
classified as a "watercraft." [Fire Insurance] thought this may "affect
coverage as per the tenns of the insured's policy." [Fire Insurance]
conceded: "This information is needed before sending out for
coverage opinion [sic]." However, the vehicle title and registration
were not secured. Fire Insurance Exchange' s Answer to Interrogatory
No. 1 (Exhibit 1 hereto). It is clear that Utah titles and registers
"personal watercraft." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-18-2(16); Vessel
Application for Utah Title (TC-656V).
At one time, Fire Insurance thought it was important to get a copy of the
vehicle registration. In fact, Fire Insurance thought the information was necessary
"before sending out for coverage opinion [sic]." It is easy to see why. If the vehicle
was registered as a "personal watercraft," as appears above, Subparagraph 7(c)
would not apply, and the coverage position would fold.
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This is what remained of Fire Insurance's factual investigation, but it was
never completed. Fire Insurance claimed in an after-the-fact explanation that the
information may be "helpful," but was not "critical." Basically, Fire Insurance
blamed the failure to secure the vehicle registration on coverage counsel: "If
coverage counsel felt the information was essential for a coverage opinion,
additional efforts to obtain said information would have been made."
Despite what Fire Insurance said when discussing the matter internally, the
trial court deemed the vehicle registration to be of no significance. Therefore, ~{18
was declared to be "undisputed." However, the failure to secure the vehicle
registration went to the heart of Fire Insurance's contention that its coverage
investigation followed company policy. Statement of Additional Facts No. 1
shows this was not true.
Oltmanns controverted 1[23 with Statement of Additional Facts No. 2:
Though it does not appear in the Statement of Undisputed Facts,
[Fire Insurance] argues, throughout its motion, that counsel rendered
a "thorough coverage opinion." (See Memorandum in Support, pg.
12). However, no facts have been stated that would support this
conclusion: i.e., what is a "thorough coverage opinion." This is,
absolutely, fatal to [Fire Insurance's] motion. Based on the vague and
conclusory nature of counsel's coverage letter, the following
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inferences must be drawn, which point to a less than "thorough
coverage opinion'':
• Counsel's opinion was based on dictum, not on the actual ruling of
the Florida case.
• Counsel did not credit that the supposedly "generic" definition of
jet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in the Florida case.
• Counsel did not credit that what made the policy exclusion
"unambiguous" was the addition of the language: "jet ski or
similar type of craft."
• Counsel did not consider what the absence of that language, in
this case, meant to the construction of the policy exclusion.
• At least, counsel attached undue significance to the dictum from
the Florida case; and did not give sufficient weight to the
difference in the policies considered in light of the Utah standard
of strict construction of insurance policy exclusions.
• Counsel did not consider how his resort to extrinsic evidence
(Wikipedia search) suggested that jet ski was susceptible to
different interpretations.
• Counsel gave no heed to the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy,
which suggested a narrower construction of jet skis.
These inferences were identified by 01 tmanns and presented to the trial
court both in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and in a
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plainly-labeled UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 56(F) declaration. Fire Insurance moved to
strike the declaration.
In response, Oltmanns cited USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, 235
P.3d 749: "Even if the moving party's objective statement of the facts are agreed
upon, reasonable inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create
a genuine issue of material fact. That the objective facts are undisputed does not
mean that no genuine issues remain as to those facts." Id., at <j{ 32 (internal
quotations omitted).
The trial court ruled that the motion was "moot." However, the questions
raised by Oltmanns show that the "75% chance of prevailing" was overstated.
There was a failure to account for the ambiguity that appeared, as a matter of law,
on the face of the policy exclusion. This was compounded by the failure of
counsel to note the law of "strict construction" that applies to insurance policy
exclusions. It ended with counsel's reliance on a case that actually supported the
acceptance of the tender; at least, a case that supported assumption of the
insured' s defense.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals (2016 UT
App 54) affirming the Order Granting Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 863) (Addendum 3 hereto), should be REVERSED.
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ADDENDUM
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ....
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony. The court n1ay permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits ....
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
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JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.
ORME, Judge:
1(1
Appellant Robert Allen Oltmanns returns to this court,
once again appealing a district court decision granting summary
judgment to Fire Insurance Exchange. The core dispute between
these two parties previously came to this court and was resolved
in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 285
P.3d 802. Last time we reversed; this time, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

c1[2
This suit grew out of an accident u1 2006 involving a
personal watercraft piloted by Oltmanns, which resulted in the
injury of Oltmanns's brother-in-lmv. Concerned early on about

Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns

potential tort liability stemming from the accident, Oltmanns
consulted with a Fire Insurance agent, who offered to assist
Oltmanns in filing a claim even though the agent was not certain
there would be coverage. 1 At that time, Oltmanns declined the
agent's offer of assistance in submitting the claim.
<Jl3
A year later, the brother-in-law sued Oltmanns for
negligence and won, obtaining a judgment against him.
Oltmanns again contacted Fire Insurance. This time, however,
Oltmanns demanded that Fire Insurance pay the full amount of
his liability to his brother-in-law under his homeowner' s
insurance policy. After extensive in-house review, Fire Insurance
submitted Oltmanns' s claim to outside counsel for a coverage
opm1on. It also told Oltmanns's attorney to continue
representing Oltmanns and informed him that Fire Insurance
might reimburse him for his fees and expenses.
Soon thereafter, in a quite thorough coverage opm10n,
outside counsel expressed the view that the term "jet ski" as
used in Oltmanns' s policy most likely would be construed as
referring to the broad category of motorized personal watercraft
such that, in counsel's opinion, "Fire Insurance had a 75% chance
of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." Counsel advised
filing such an action to receive a definitive ruling on the
coverage question, and Fire Insurance then filed this declaratory
judgment action seeking a determination of its responsibility to
Oltmanns under his policy.
<j{4

Shortly after filing its action, Fire Insurance moved for
summary judgment, and the district court, agreeing with outside
counsel's interpretation, ruled in favor of Fire Insurance.
<]15

1. Oltmanns' s policy with Fire Insurance excluded coverage for

accidents involving the use of "jet skis." In the prior appeal, we
concluded that this term was ambiguous. See Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, <JI 10, 285 P.3d 802.
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Oltmanns appealed, and we reversed, concluding that although
one definition of the term "jet ski" supported the view taken by
Fire Insurance and the district court, the term was ambiguous
because "jet ski" was subject to several different interpretations,
some of which favored Oltmanns. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230,
<jf<Jl 9-10. Construing the contract against the drafter and in favor
of the policyholder, we ruled in favor of Oltmanns and
remanded the case to the district court. Id. 1[ 11.
Fire Insurance did not petition for rehearing, did not
petition for certiorari review, and did not try to develop new
arguments for the district court's consideration on remand. On
the contrary, it promptly settled with Oltmanns and agreed to
reimburse him for the attorney fees incurred in defending the
tort case. Fire Insurance declined, however, to cover Oltmanns' s
attorney fees related to the coverage dispute, including those
related to the successful appeal from the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Fire Insurance.
<jf 6

In an effort to recover those attorney fees, Oltmanns filed
a counterclaim against Fire Insurance in the still-open
declaratory judgment action, claiming breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for Fire Insurance's
alleged failure to "fairly evaluate" the claim pending against
Oltmanns and for "unreasonably reject(ing]" that claim. 2 The
parties began discovery on the issues presented by the
counterclaim in the fall of 2013.
1(7

2. Unlike some insurance policies that apparently allow for the
recovery of attorney fees from the insurer by the insured
following a successful coverage action, both sides indicated
during oral argument that the insurance contract in this case has
no such provision. Therefore, the parties agree, Oltmanns is
entitled to recover his attorney fees only if he can prove bad
faith-or at least a lack of good faith-by Fire Insurance.

20140984-C A
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Almost a year later, Fire Insurance moved for summary
judgment, relying on the coverage opinion letter and the
affidavit of the claims specialist who investigated Oltmanns' s
insurance claim. Despite Oltmanns' s opposition to the motion,
the district court determined that Fire Insurance's denial of the
claim was reasonable because the interpretation issue was fairly
debatable. The court granted summary judgment to Fire
Insurance.
<JIB

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Oltmanns contends that Fire Insurance was not entitled to
summary judgment because the interpretation question was not
"fairly debatable" as a matter of law. Whether denial of a claim
was "fairly debatable under the facts ... is a question of law that
we review for correctness." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002
UT 68, en 33, 56 P.3d 524. Although on summary judgment we
ordinarily "accord no deference to the district court's
conclusions of law, including its interpretation of precedent and
statute," Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, en 13, 289 P.3d 479, given the
highly fact-intensive inquiry typically necessary to make a
"fairly debatable" determination, "trial courts have 'some
discretion'" and "we will therefore 'grant the trial court's
conclusion some deference'" when the pivotal question is fact
sensitive, Prince, 2002 UT 68, <J[ 33 (quoting Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996)). Here, it is not, see
infra 1[ 12, and so we review the district court's ruling for
correctness, according it no deference.
CJ[9

ANALYSIS

1110

Oltmanns challenges Fire Insurance's decision to obtain a
coverage determination through its declaratory judgment action,
claiming that Fire Insurance's decision to do so was in bad
faith, breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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Fire Insurance, for its part, defends its actions as reasonable
under the "fairly debatable standard. The district court agreed
with Fire Insurance and granted summary judgment in its favor.
11

1111 "[D]enial of a claim is reasonable if the insured' s claim is
fairly debatable." Prince, 2002 UT 68, lj{ 28. This is because "if an
insurer denies an 'insured's claim [that] is fairly debatable, [then]
the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have
breached the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] if
it chooses to do so."' Id. (quoting Morris v. Health Net of Cal., Inc.,
1999 UT 95, <jl 7, 988 P.2d 940) (first and second alterations in
original) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court's prior ruling validating Fire Insurance's
interpretation of the policy surely seems to make it difficult to
argue that Fire Insurance's position was not at least "fairly
debatable."
1112 In some respects, the instant case is not unlike previous
"fairly debatable" cases in that reasonable minds could-and
did-differ as to their interpretation of key points. See id. <j[<_[ 3536; Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987). See also Morris v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 1999 UT 95,
1l 7, 988 P.2d 940 ("[U]nder Utah law, 'when an insured' s claim is
fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it[.]"') (quoting
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996)).
Unlike those cases, however, here the facts are not in dispute
and never have been; instead, this case concerns a purely legal
issue, i.e., whether the term "jet ski" as used in Oltmanns' s
insurance policy was ambiguous as a matter of law. In the first
appeal, we concluded that the term was ambiguous, and
resolved the ambiguity against the insurer. See Oltmanns, 2012
UT App 230, 1I'll 10-11. See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993) ("[P]rovisions that limit
or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against
the insurer.'').

20140984-CA

5

2016 UT App 54

Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns

<J{13 This conclusion does not, however, compel the
determination that the meaning of the clause in question was not
"fairly debatable." On the contrary, considering the totality of
the circumstances, it is very relevant that courts, albeit in
somewhat different contexts than that presented in this case,
have concluded that both "stand-up" and "sit-down" watercraft
may be considered jet skis. See, e.g., Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43
Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2006) (referring to a twoseater personal watercraft as a "jet ski"); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (per curiam) ("The term 'jet ski' is often used as
a generic term for all personal watercraft despite the fact that it
is a registered trademark of Kawasaki."). It is additionally
relevant that Wikipedia, the key source for our conclusion in
Oltmanns as to the colloquial understanding of the term "jet ski,"
now features no less than four different definitions of the
term, one of which supports Oltmanns' s position and one of
which supports that of Fire Insurance. See Jet Ski, Wikipedia,
https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/J et_Ski
[https://perma.cc/ZSN93
M2CG] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). Finally, we find it very
3. The Wikipedia entry, as presently constituted, actually
furnishes stronger support for Fire Insurance's position than it
previously did, because the "sit-down" and "stand-up"
distinction we relied upon in seeing ambiguity has since been
deleted. C01npare Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT
App 230, <JI 9, 285 P.3d 802 ("The term 'Jet Ski' ... is often misapplied to all personal watercraft with pivoting handlepoles
manipulated by a standing rider; these are properly known as
Stand-up [Personal Watercraft]."), with Jet Ski, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jet_Ski
[https://perma.cc/ZSN9M2CG] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) ("Jet Ski is the brand name of a
personal watercraft manufactured by Kawasaki. ... The term is
sometimes used to refer to any type of personal watercraft ....
Though the proper noun 'Jet Ski' is a registered trademark of
(continued ... )
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persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire
Insurance's theory and argument in this case, i.e., in the first
round of judicial consideration, not only was there a debate, but
Fire Insurance actually won the debate.
1{14 As a further note, although it is true that we ultimately
accepted the definition argued for by Oltmanns in Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 285 P.3d 802, we did so
only after applying the interpretative rule that ambiguous
exclusions are to be construed against the insurer. Id. <j{ 6.
Moreover, we applied that rule even though application of the
rule, in these precise terms, was not Oltmanns's primary theory
in the original appeal.

CONCLUSION

<JllS An insurance company may reasonably and fairly rely, at
least initia11y, upon a coverage opinion from qualified outside
counsel, received in the course of careful investigation and
evaluation of a claim. Moreover, submitting the issue to a court
for interpretation in a declaratory judgment action is a prudent,
reasonable step toward the resolution of a legitimate dispute
( ... continued)
Kawasaki, the common noun 'jet ski' refers to small recreational
watercraft."). 1t is, of course, difficult to discern whether the
change came about in response to our prior opinion, perhaps at
the instance of someone with a stake in the debate. See generally
Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 1l 18 n.3 (Voros, J., concurring)
("Among its shortcomings-and strengths-is Wikipedia's
fluidity. Anyone can edit a Wikipedia entry at any time, making
it vulnerable to opportunistic editing. Thus, an unscrupulous
lawyer (or client) could edit the Web site entry to frame the facts
in a light favorable to the client's cause.") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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over a coverage term or exclusion. And when an insurance
company proceeds in a reasonable way to resolve a difficult
coverage question, its eventual loss at the appellate level does
not foreclose a determination that an issue of interpretation was
fairly debatable, as was the case here.
116

Affirmed. 4

4. Oltmanns also chaHenges the district court's denial of a
motion he filed under former rule 56(£) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure. Because we conclude that Fire Insurance's
interpretation of the term "jet ski" as used in Oltmanns' s
insurance policy was "fairly debatable" as a matter of law, supra
<j[<jl 11-13, we decline to consider this issue.
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, BAR NO. 0649
JOEL D. TAYLOR, BAR NO. 13378
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple. Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (80 l) 363-76 l l
Facsimile: (80 l) 531-9747
Email: schristensen@pckutah.com
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff:

ORDER GRANTING FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 090700825
V.

Honorable Glen R. Dawson

ROBERT ALLEN OLTMANNS, BRADY
BLACKNER,
Dcfendanls.

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Fire Insurance Exchange's ("Fire Insurance" or
"Plaintiff'). motion for summary judgment duly came before this Court for hearing on
September 24, 2014, at I :30 p.m. Fire Insurance Exchange appeared through its counsel, Joel D.
Taylor. Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff~ Robert Allen Oltmanns ('~Oltmanns" or

"Defendant''), ,1ppeared through his attorney. Donald L. Dalton. Prior to the hearing the parties
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submitted memoranda which were reviewed by the Court, and the Court heard oral arguments
from each of the parties.
In response to the motion, Oltmanns filed a memorandum in opposition asserting that
genuine issues existed as to certain material facts. The memorandum was supported by a
declaration by Oltmanns' counsel tmder Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) and (t). However, the Court
was not persuaded by Oltmanns' opposition. Therefore, the Court, being fully advised,
concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. The
Court further concludes that the following material facts are undisputed:
l. This action concerns a policy of homeowners insurance issued by Plaintiff to Defendant

Oltmanns.
2. Oltmanns was sued by Brady Blackner for injuries he sustained while Oltmanns was
operating a Honda F-12 AquaTrax personal watercraft in Case No. 070700309.
3. In September 2006~ Oltmanns went to his insurance agent, Sherrie Eichmeier, to inquire

about his homeowners insurance policy.
4. In September 2006, Oltmanns and Sherrie Eichmeier read the exclusions in Oltmanns'
homeowners insurance policy. Both Oltmanns and Sherrie Eichmeier thought that
Oltmanns' accident that occurred on July l I, 2006, was probably not covered due to the
language contained in the exclusion regarding ~jet skis.'
5. Sherrie Eichmeier told Oltmanns the only way to determine if coverage was provided
2

October 10, 2014 11:51 AM

2 of 11

under his homeowners policy for his July I 1, 2006, accident was to submit a formal
claim on his homeowners insurance policy so that an investigation could be conducted.

6. Sherrie Eichmeier offered to assist Oltmanns in making a formal claim on his
homeowners insurance policy so that a formal investigation could be conducted on
Oltmanns' July l l. 2006 accident, to see if coverage was available.
7. Robert Oltmanns declined Sherrie Eichmeier's offer to assist him in making a formal
claim on his homeowners insurance policy for the July 11, 2006 accident.

8. In September 2006, Robert Oltmanns decided he did not want to make a claim on his
homeO\vners insurance policy to see if coverage was provided for his July 11, 2006, wave
runner accident.
9. Robert Oltmanns never asked Sherrie Eichmeier to assist him in making a formal claim
on his homeowners insurance policy in September 2006 to determine if his July 11, 2006,
wave runner accident was covered under his homeowners insurance policy.
10. Oltmanns alleges that during this interaction with Sherrie Eichmeier in 2006 that he
tendered a claim on his homeowners policy for his accident on July 11, 2006. Oltmanns
alleges that Fire Insurance denied this claim.
11. The Bla,.::kner lawsuit was filed against Oltmanns the following year in June 2007.
12. On August 26. 2009. Oltmanns tendered defense of Blackner v. Caserio, Case No.
070700309, Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, to Fire
3
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Insurance.

13. Oltmanns in his Second Amended Counterclaim alleges, for the first time, the claim was
"re-tendered" to Fire Insurance on August 26, 2009.
14. The next day on August 27. 2009, Shawn Stephens, Litigation Claims Specialist for Fire
Insurance, contacted Oltmanns' counsel, Don Dalton, to discuss the language of

Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy.
15. Shawn Stephens told Mr. Dalton that if Oltmanns was seeking coverage for the accident

that occurred on July 11, 2006, that Fire Insurance would complete a thorough
investigation of the loss and how coverage would potentially apply.
16. Shawn Stephens specifically told Don Dalton that his email on August 27, 2009, was not
to be misconstrued as a denial of any kind, regarding Oltmanns' accident.
17. In response to Shawn Stephens' August 27, 2009 email, Mr. Dalton informed Fire
Insurance that Oltmanns was making a claim on his homeowners insurance policy.

18. Starting the next day on August 28, 2009, Fire Insurance began a coverage investigation

and evaluation regarding the accident in July of 2006 that involved Oltmanns. Shawn
Stephens, in conducting the

investigation and evaluation, requested and received the

summons and complaint filed against Oltmanns (Case No. 070700309), the cross-claim
against Oltmanns from the rental companies, a copy of the rental agreement for the
personal watercraft, and the deposition transcript of Robert Oltmanns regarding the
4
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accident in Case No. 070700309. Initially, Fire Insurance stated that it "began a
thorough coverage investigation." Oltmanns objected that the statement was nothing but

a conclusion that was not supported by the facts. Oltmanns, also, referred to his
Statement of Additional Fact No. l (below). In response, Fire Insurance withdrew the
word "thorough.~' Given the foregoing regarding the use of the word 'thorough' this
Court concludes that Oltmanns' denial creates no genuine issue of material fact which
would preclude summary judgment. Therefore, this fact is undisputed.
19. It took several weeks for Fire Insurance to obtain the necessary documents needed to
complete a coverage investigation and evaluation.
20. Fire Insurance held a meeting in the claims litigation department, which included
supervisors, about Oltmanns' claim and demand for coverage. As a result of the meeting,
Fire Insurance decided to send the matter to outside counsel for a coverage opinion.
21. On November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance sent a copy of their file to attorney Alma Nelson
for a coverage opinion as to whether the July 2006 accident was a covered occurrence
under Robert Oltmanns· policy. The documents Fire Insurance sent to Mr. Nelson for his
coverage opinion included: the summons and complaint against Robert Oltmanns in case
no. 070700309: the filed answers to the complaint for case no. 070700309; a copy of the
rental agreement for the personal watercraft; Robert Oltmanns' Deposition transcript in
case no. 070700309; and correspondence with Mr. Dalton.
22. Also on November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance sent a letter to Don Dalton to inform him that
5
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the matter was sent to outside counsel for a coverage opinion. Fire Insurance asked Mr.
Dalton to continue defending Robert Oltmanns and told him that in the event coverage
was extended for the July 2006 accident, Fire Insurance would reimburse him for the
costs and foes incurred by Robert Oltmanns.
23. On December 1 I. 2009, Fire Insurance received the coverage opinion from attorney

Alma Nelson. Based on Alma Nelson's research regarding the term "jet-ski," Mr. Nelson
believed that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action.
In his coverage opinion, Mr. Nelson sought authorization to file a declaratory relief
action. Oltmanns objected that the statement, based on Mr. Nelson's letter, was
inadmissible, conclusory, hearsay since there was no explanation for the "75%" coverage
evaluation. See Statement of Additional Fact No. 2. Fire Insurance responded that the
statement was not offered for "the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 80l(c)(2).
However, this Court finds that statement is based upon the understanding of Shawn
Stephens for Fire Insurance, as set forth in his affidavit. The Court concludes that the
statement of fact is not hearsay because receiving the coverage opinion from coverage
counsel. Attorney Alma Nelson, was part of the process of investigating the facts of the
accident and fairly evaluating the claim. Thus, Oltmanns' response creates no genuine
issue of material fact. As a result, this Court concludes that this statement of fact is
undisputed.
24. On December 14, 2009. Fire Insurance authorized attorney Alma Nelson to file the
declaratory relief action.
6
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25. The declaratory relief action was filed on December 18, 2009.
26. Robert Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy which is at issue in this matter does not
provide attorney's fees for Oltmanns for representation against Fire Insurance when Fire
Insurance files a declaratory relief action.
27. Oltmanns seeks damages for alleged breach of contract and the alleged breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically, Oltmanns alleges '4Plaintiff
did not fairly evaluate the claim! and unreasonably rejected it, in violation of Utah law,
thus breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In addition,
Oltmanns alleges he is entitled to attorney's fees and damages for "severe emotional
distress caused by the coverage denial. ... "
28. Oltmanns never sought nor received any medical treatment for his alleged severe
emotional distress. Oltmanns objected that the statement was irrelevant because
Defendant OLTMANNS has made no claim (in tort) for 'emotional distress.' Rather,
Defendant OLTMANNS' claim is for consequential damages, in this case, attorney's fees
and 'mental anguish,~ resulting from breach of the insurance contract and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court, however, concludes that Oltmanns'
response to this stntement of fact creates no genuine issue of material fact which would
preclude the granting of summary judgment.
29. After the Court of Appeals remanded this case to the district court, Fire Insurance settled
the underlying ch1ims against Defendant Oltmanns. The Blackner lawsuit was dismissed.
7
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(October 30. 2012). Oltmanns' objected that this statement of fact is immaterial. This
Com1. however. concludes that Oltmanns' response to this statement creates no genuine
issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. In
addition. this Court concludes that this statement of fact is material, in that it shows Fire
Insurance continually acted in good faith throughout the legal process. It further shows
that Fire Insurance acted promptly and reasonably in settling the claim against Oltmanns.
30. Fire Insurance paid Oltmanns for his costs and attorney's fees incurred in the defense of

the Blackner case. Oltmanns' objected that this statement of fact is immaterial. This
Court, however. concludes that Oltmanns' response to this statement creates no genuine
issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. In
addition, this Court concludes that this statement of fact is material, in that it shows Fire
Insurance continually acted in good faith throughout the legal process and in showing
that Fire Insurance acted promptly and reasonably in settling the claim against Oltmanns.
31. This Court is the trier of fact in this matter.
32. Oltmanns made the following statement of additional fact (No. 1), which was based on
Fire Insurance's response to Oltmanns' interrogatories: "Before sending the claim for a
coverage evaluation, Plaintiff determined that it needed a copy of the vehicle title and
registration at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is classified.
Plaintiff wanted to know ir the vehicle were classified as a 'watercraft.' Plaintiff thought
this may affect coverage as per the terms of the insurecl's policy. Plaintiff conceded: This
8

October 10, 2014 11 :51 AM

8 of 11

information is needed before sending out for coverage opinion [sic]. However, the
vehicle title and registration were not secured. It is clear that Utah titles and registers
'personal watercraft.' Utah Code Ann.§ 73-18-2(16); Vessel Application for Utah Title
(TC-656V).'' (internal quotations omitted). Fire Insurance objected on the same basis that

it objected to the interrogatories. At the same time, Fire Insurance repeated the complete
answer it gave to the interrogatories: "Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said
information prior to sending the matter out for a coverage opinion. However, said
information may have assisted coverage counsel in understanding how the Honda F-12
personal watercratt was classified. In addition, the registration may have provided
technical language~ including to whom the watercraft was registered to. Fire Insurance
Exchange sought to provide coverage counsel with as much information as possible
within the time constraints. It was determined that the identified information would be
helpful, but it was not felt to be critical. If coverage counsel felt the information was
essential for a coverage opinion, additional efforts to obtain said information would have
been made.~' The Court concludes that this additional fact, along with the response from
Fire Insurance that if coverage counsel felt the information to be necessary for the
coverage opinion that additional efforts to obtain the information would have been made,
creates no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. As a result, this
fact is undisputed in Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Given the foregoing undisputed material facts, this Court concludes that Fire Insurance,

in relation to the claim made by Brady Blackner against Robert Oltmanns, diligently investigated
9
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the facts to determine if the claim was valid. Fire Insurance fairly evaluated the claim.
Thereafter. Fire Insurance, acted promptly and reasonably by first filing a declaratory relief
action and ultimately settling the claim against Robert Oltmanns on his behalf. This Court
concludes that Fire Insurance was faced with a fairly debatable question surrounding the
coverage of Brady Blackners' claims against Robert Oltmanns. Specifically, this Court
concludes the definition of •jet skis' as found in Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy
presented a fairly debatable claim. Thus, this Court concludes Fire Insurance was entitled to
seek a declaratory judgment as to its obligations to Oltmanns and its duties under the insurance
contract. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons this Court concludes that Fire Insurance did not
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to Oltmanns. Further, this Court
concludes that Fire lnsurance did not breach the insurance contract with Oltmanns. Just the
opposite, this Court concludes that Fire Insurance continually acted in good faith and performed
its duties under the homeowners insurance contract with Oltmanns. It is therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Oltmanns' claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Oltmanns'
claim of breach of contract is GRANTED. Accordingly, Oltmanns' causes of action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract as found in the
Second Amended Counterclaim arc DISMISSED with prejudice. Fire Insurance's motion to
strike the declaration of Oltmanns' counsel is denied as moot. At the hearing, Fire Insurance
withdrew its motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations (Utah Code Ann. § 31A2 l313). The Court allowed the motion to dismiss to be withdrawn without prejudice. This
IO
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ORDER granting summary judgment in favor of Fire Insurance disposes of all claims against
Fire Insurance in this action and is the final order.
****** ******* * * * * ** * * ** ********END OF ORD ER*****************************
Signature of COURT at the top.

Approved as to Form:
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC

I sl Donald L. Dalton

I

Donald L. Dalto11
Attorney for Robert Allen Oltmanns
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DONALD L. DALTON-4305
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC
Attorneys for Counterclaim Plaintiff
Post Office Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Telephone: (801) 583-2510

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF DONALD L.
DALTON (RULE 56(f))

Vs.

ROBERT ALLEN OLTMANNS, BRADY
BLACKNER,

Case No. 090700825
Honorable Glen R. Dawson

Defendants.

DONALD L. DALTON, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, declares as follows:
1. As appears from Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary Judgment, it relied on
the advice of counsel in refusing the tender of defense of the claim against Defendant
OLTMANNS.
2. The advice appears in a letter of counsel dated December 11, 2009 (Exhibit J). The letter
is referenced in the Affidavit of Shawn L. Stephens (Exhibit D, ~ 14). However, there is
no affidavit of counsel, and he has not been deposed.

3. What appears to have been most significant to Plaintiff was counsel's statement of "a
75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory judgment action." (Exhibit J, pg. 8). However,

there is no explanation how counsel came to this determination.
4. It appears to have been based on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So.2d
1162 (Fla. App. 1992). However, it appears to have been based on dictum from the case.
5. Specifically, it appears to have been based on the Florida court's observation that "[t]he

tenn 'jet ski' is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft despite the fact
that it is a registered trademark of Kawasaki." 596 So.2d at I I 63. However, this was not
the basis for the court's ruling.

6. Rather, the rnling was based on the unambiguous policy exclusion ("jet ski or similar
type of craft." 596 So.2cl at I 164. The ruling was also based on the trial record that
showed "the Yamaha Wave Runner [was], at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet
Ski." Id.
7. Given the circumstances of the case, it appears quite clear that the supposedly "generic"
nature ofjet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in that case.
8. Based on this, I would ask counsel how he reconciled the Florida court rnling - rather
than its dictum - with the coverage determination.
9. I would also ask whether, and if so, to what extent, he factored in the Utah rnle of strict
construction of insurance policy exclusions.
10. I would ask counsel if he considered whether his resort to extrinsic evidence (Wikipedia
search) suggested that jet skis was susceptible to different interpretations.

11. I would also ask if he considered whether the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy
suggested a narrower interpretation ofjet skis.
12. It was not possible to depose counsel, in response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment because of the expiration of the discovery cut-off. See Amended Scheduling
Order, ~1 (March 5, 2014). See also Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(t).
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on this 13 th day of June, 2014.

Isl Donald L. Dalton
DONALD L. DALTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing,
th
"Declaration of Donald L. Dalton (Rule 56(f))," to bee-filed this 13 day of June, 2014, with
service to:
Scott W. Christensen

Joel D. Taylor
Plant, Christensen & Kanell, P .C.
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Isl Donald L. Dalton
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December 11, 2009

Sent To Farmers Document Center and to Personal E-Mail
Mr. Shawn L. Stephens
Field Claims Representative
. Fire InslU'ance Exchange

P.O. Box 268994
Oklahoma City, OK 73126
shawn.stejJhens@farmersinsurance.com
Re:

Insured:
Claim No.:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claimant:

R & E Oltmanns
1014609377
76 0919082163
07/11/2006
Brady Blackner

Dear Mr. Stephens:
This letter is in response to yom· request for our opinion regarding coverage to your insured,
Robert Oltmanns, for claims made against Mr. Oltmanns by Brady Blac]mer for injuries sustained
by Mr. Blaclmer as a result of an accident involving a Honda F-12 personal watercraft.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
On July _11, 2006, your insw-ed, Robert Oltmanns, was operating a Honda F-12 personal
watercraft, from ,,vhich he was towing Brady Blackner on a tube. The tube ran into a rock, causing
injuries to Mr. Blaclmer' s foot, thigh and ankle.
The Honda personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltma1ms at the time of the accident was
owned by friple R Rental~ Inc., ,md had been rented to Keith Caserio before the accident. Mr.
Caserio allowed Robert Oltmaims to operate the personal watercraft at the time of the accident.

Brady Blackner has brought suit against Keith Cascrio, Robert Oltmanns and various rental
companies to recover for bis injuries. Mr. Blackner alleges that the accident was caused by
neg1igence of Robert Oltmanns in the operation of the Honda pernonal watercraft and by negligence
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of Mr Caserio and the rental companies in entrusting the watercraft to a person who was not trained
or competent to drive the watercraft. He alleges general and special damages, and punitive damages,
"if the evidences warrant such.,,
Both the Complaint and the Answer by Mr. Oltmanns' attorney refer to a date of the accident
in July of 2003. This appears to be an error, as the rental agreement for the personal watercraft is
dated July 6, 2006.
At the time of the accident, Robert Oltmam1s was insured under a Protector Plus
Homeowners package policy, Fourth Edition, with Fire Insurance Exchange, having liability limits
of $300,000. Mr. Oltmanns apparently advised his insurance agent, Sherrie Eicluneier, of claims
made against him by Mr. Blackner in Septembe1= of 2006, but the agent told him there was no
coverage. Mr. Oltmanns' attorney, Donald L. Dalton, then appeared on behalf of Mr. Oltmanns in
the lawsuit filed by Mr. Blaclmcr and has been defending that lawsuit on behalf of l'vlr. Oltmanns
since July of 2007.
On August 26, 2009, Mr. Dalton sent a letter to agent Sherrie Eichmeier, tendering the
·defense of Mr. Oltmann in the pending lawsuit to Fire Insurance Exchange, and arguing that
coverage would apply under the homeowners policy. On September 30, 2009, KraigKimberofFire

fnslll'ance Exchange sent a letter to Mr. Oltmann with a reservation ofrights to deny coverage. On
November 20, 2009, Shawn Stephens sent a letter to Mr. Oltmanns' attorneys, advising them that
Fire Insurance Exchange was sending the matter to outside counsel for a coverage opinion and
asking that Mr. Dalton continue to represent Mr. Oltmanns in the lawsuit. Mr. Stephens' letter stated
that ifcoverage is extended, Fire Insurance Exchange will reimburse Mr. Dalton for reasonable costs
and expenses for defense of the case from the date Fire Insurance Exchange received the Notice of
Claim, August 26, 2009, until a coverage decision is made.

POLICY PROVISIONS
The Farmers Protector Plus homeowners package policy provides liability coverage as
follows:
Coverage .E - Personal Liability
We will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally
obligated to pay because of bodily injury ... resulting from an
occurrence to whi~h this coverage applies ... .
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At our expense and with attorneys of our choice we will defend an
insured against any covered claim or suit ....
The policy contains the following exclusion:

Applying To Coverage E and F - Personal Liability and Medical
Pnyments to Others
We do not cover bodily injury ... which

7.

Results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of:

a.

Aircraft

b.
c.
d.

Motor vehicles
jet skis and jet sleds or
Any other watercraft owned or rented to an
insured and which:
(I) Has more than 5 0 horsepower
inboard or outboard-outdrive motor
power; or
(2) Is powered by one or more
outboard motors with more than 25
total horsepower; or
(3) Is a sailing vessel 26 feet or more
in length.

8.

Results from the entrustment ofany aircraft, motor vehicles,
jet skis or jet sleds to any person. Entrustment means the
permission you give to any person other than you to use any
personal aircraft, motor vehicles,jet skis or jet sleds owned
or contrnllecl by you.
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9.

Results from the entrustment of watercraft described in 7d
above.

Exclusion 7c, clearly excludes coverage for injuries resulting from Hownership, maintenance,
use, loading or unloading" of "jet skis and jet sleds. n The question is whether the Honda F-12
personal watercraft operated by IVlr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was a '\jet ski" under the
terms of the policy. We will discuss this issue hereafter.
Exclusion 7d, which excludes coverage for ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of"any other watercraft owned or rented to an insured'' would not apply, since the Honda
personal watercr~(t which was operated by Mr. Oltmmms at the time of the accident was not "owned
or rented to an insured» tmder the terms of the policy. It was rented to Keith Caserio, who was not
an insured under the Fire Insurance Exchange homeowners policy issued to Mr. Oltmanns. ·
Exclusion 8, which excJudes coverage for injury which "results from the entrustment of ..
. jet skis ... to any person" would not apply because this exclusion defines "entrustment" as "the
permission you give to any person other than you to use any ... jet skis ... owned or cont.rolled by
you." The policy defines "you', as the named insmecl and spouse, if a resident of the same
household. Since the Honda personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmaims at the time of the
accident was not owned by Mr. Oltmanns, and Mr. Oltmanns did not give permission to anyone else
to operate the Honda personal watercraft, the exclusion for entrustment would not apply.
Exclusiqn No. 9 also would not apply. Exclusion No. 9 excJudes coverage for injury which
".results from tl1e entrust:ment of watercraft described in 7cl above.'' The "watercraff described in
7d is watercraft owned or rented to an insured. As discussed above, since the Honda personal
watercraft was not owned or rented to Mr. Oltmanns, or any other insmed under Mr. Oltmanns'
policy, thjs exclusion vvould not apply.
1

Sin~e none of the other exclusions apply, the coverage issue comes clown to whet.her the
Honda personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was a "jet ski" under
the terms of the exclusion in the Fire Insurance Exchange policy.
BLACKNER AND OLTMANNS' CLAIMS OF COVERAGE

The attorneys for Brady Blaclmer and Robert Oltmanns obvio_usly will be aTguing that a "jet
ski" is a particular brand and type of personal watercraft, and that the exclusion in the Fire Insurance
Exchange policy should not apply to the Honda F-12 personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmanns
at the time of the accident. In focl, the attorney for Mr. Blackner has tried to set this up through
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questions asked of Mr. Oltmaims in Mr. Oltmanns' deposition. On page 31 of Mr. Oltmanns'
deposition, the following testimony appears:

Q: Okay. let me ask you, at the time of the accident did you
know what a Jet Ski was?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did you have an understanding of how a Jet Ski may differ
from the term personal watercraft?
A: No, I did not know the difference.
Q: Do you lmow the difference now?
A:No.
Q: Do you have any memory of what type of personal
watercraft you were driving?
A: From what I remember I think it was a Honda.
Q: Did it say Jet Ski anywhere on it?
A: I don't remember. •

(Deposition ofRobert Oltmanns, pp.31~32.)
Later in the deposition, Mr. Blaclmer's attorney showed Ivfr. Oltmanns' pictures of what he
called a "Jet Ski," and the following testimony was given:
Q: Let me represent to you that this is a Jet Sld. Have you
ever seen this type of personal watercraft when you've been boating
or out on the lake?
A: Is this the one where the handle sits up?
Q: Right.
A: Yeah I have.
Q: And have you seen how the riders can stand up on them
and they operate it by moving the handle up and down?
A: Yeah.
Q: Is that different than the personal watercraft that you were
driving when this accident happened?
A: Yes.
Q: And the mode of operation from what you've observed
from a Jet Ski is very different than the personal watercraft that you
were riding; is that correct?
A: Yeah, I would -yeah.
Q: And you've never operated a Jet Ski: is that correct?
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A: I have never.

(Deposition of Robert Olhnanns, pp. 37-38.)

ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE
The Fire Insurance Exchange homeowners policy excludes coverage for injuries which result
from the "ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading" of "jet skis." The term 'Jet skis,, in
the policy is not capitalized. Nevertheless, Mr. Blaclmer and Mr. Oltmrums will argue that this is
a brand name, or at least refers to a particular type of personal watercraft in which the handlebars
raise up and the rider stands while operating the watercraft. I do not believe this claim is supported
by either the evidence or the case law.
Under Utah law, a liability insurance carrier's duty to defend is broader than its duty to
indemnify. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986). In general, an insurer's duty to defend is determiz=ied by comparing the
allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the insurance policy. Fire Insurance Exchange
v. Estate of Otto F Therkelsen, Jr., 200i UT 48; 27 P.3d 555. The Utah Supreme Corn"l has held,
however, that where the policy language is the same as the language of the Fire Insurance Exchange
homeowners policy, the i11surer may look beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine if
coverage applied under the facts of the case. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Therkelsen, supra; Fire
Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202 (Utah App. 1997).

Under Utah law, if an insurance policy provision is not ambiguous, it will be interpreted
according to its terms. If the policy provision is ambiguous, it wi1l be construed in favor of coverage.
Saleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2006 UT 20, 133 PJd 428. Unless the language of an
insurance contract is ambiguous or unclear, the court must construe it according to its plain and
ordinary meaning. Miller v. US.(1A Casualty Insurance Co., 2002 UT 6, 44 P .3d 663.
The terrn "jet ski" is not defined in the Fire Insurance Exchange policy. Therefore, we must
look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term and decide if it is ambiguous.
"Jct Ski®n is a trade name for Kawasaki. The attorney for Mr. Blackner apparently claims
that the Kawasaki "Jet Ski®" is a stand-up personal watercraft with handlebars that rnise up to allow
the operator to stand. 1n fact, Kawasaki "Jet Ski®" makes both a stand-up model and a sit-down
model. The sit-down model is practically identical to the Honda AquaTrax® F-12 personal
watercraft which Mr. Oltmanns was operating at the time of the accident. \Ve are enclosing
documents which we obtained from the internet showing both the stand-up model Kawasaki Jet Ski
and lhc sit-down model Kawasaki Jet Ski, as well as the Honda AquaTrax@ F-12 personal
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watercraft. We Googled the term "jet ski,U and the first name that came up was the Honda
AquaTrax®. A copy of that web search is enclosed.
We also went to Wikipedia and looked at "jet ski." A copy of the article from Wikipedia is
enclosed. The article states:
Jet Ski is the brand name of a personal watercraft (PWC)
manufactured by Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The name, however,
has become a generlcized trademark for any type of personal
watercraft. Jet.Ski (or JetSki, often shortened to "Ski") can also refer
to versions of PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as "standups." Sit-down PWCs are also called "Jet Skis."
A general search of comi cases finds numerous cases in which the com1s have referred to
various brands· of personal watercraft as "jet skis.,, For example, in Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc.,
139 Cal. App. 4 th 755, 43 Cal. Rpt:r. 3d 215 {2006), the cowt referred to a two-seater Polaris personal
watercraft as a "jet ski," and to its operator as a "jet skier." In .Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, v.
Colombo, the United States Comi of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referred to a Sea-Doo personal
watercraft as a "jet ski.,,
Because of the unique language of the Fire Insrn·ance Exchange policy, we have not found
the exact language of the Fire InslU'ance Exchange policy in any other cases which have addressed
the question of what constitutes a '1et ski" for purposes of an exclusion under a homeowners policy.
A case which is very close to the present case, however, is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Johnson, 596 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. App. 1992). In that case, Mr. Johnson was operating a Yamaha
Wave Ruru1er personal watercraft when he was involved in an accident causing personal injuries.
Mr. Johnson sought liability coverage under his homeowners policy, but State Farm denied coverage
based on an exclusion in the State Farm policy for bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a-watercraft "designed as ,m air boat, air cushion, jet ski or
similar type of craft.)) Mr. Jolmson then filed a declaratory relief action, claiming that the Yamaha
Wave Runner which he was operating at the time of the accident was not a ''jet ski or similar type
of craft.'' Mr. Johnson argued that the Yamaha Wave Runner, unlike the Kawasaki Jet Ski, could
be operated from a sitting position and was not similar to a Jet Ski.
At the trial of the declaratory relief action, State Farm presented evidence that Kawasalci
manufactured both a stand-up and a sit-down model Jet Ski, and that the Jet Ski was virtually
identical to the Yamaha Wave Runner. Sales brochures for both the Kavvasaki Jet Ski and the
Yamaha Wave Runner were entered into evidence, demonstrating that the two personal watercraft
were virtually identical. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Stale Farm policy did not clearly
exclude coverage for a Wave Rmmer, and held that coverage applied.
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.On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the Yamaha
Wave Rmmer was clearly a "jet ski or similar type of craft," and that coverage was clearly excluded
under the State Farm policy. The court noted that the average person could not differentiate between
the Kawasaki Jet Ski and the Yamaha Wave Rmmer. The court further noted that the term "jet ski"
is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft, despite the fact that it was a registered
trademark of Kawasaki. The court heJcl that the policy language was not ambiguous, and that the
Yamaha Wave Runner was, at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet Ski.
The Johnson case is slightly different from the present case in that the State Fann policy
excluded coverage for a ')et ski or similar type of craft,'' while the Fire Insurance Exchange policy
excludes coverage just for a "jet ski.'' Nevertheless, since "jet ski" is used generically for all
watercrafl, since the comts have regularly used the term "jet ski" to refer to various brands of
watercraft, and since a reasonable policyholder would not see any difference between coverage for
a Kawasaki jet ski or any other brand of personal watercraft, I believe we have a very strong
argument that the Fire Insurance Exchange policy excludes coverage for the accident in question.
Based on the information we now have, I believe we have a 75% chance of prevailing in a
declaratory relief action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is obvious from the deposition of Robert OJtmanns that Brady Blackner's attorney is
attempting to set up Fire Insurance Exchange for liability on this claim. It would be dangerous to
simply deny coverage because Mr. Blackner and Mr. Oltmanns may enter into an agreement to
stipulate to a lasge judgment and Mr. Oltmatms could then assign h.is claims against Fire Insmance
exchange to Mr. Blackner.
Since we are likely to become involved in litigation anyway, I recommend that you authorize

me to file a declaratory relief action against Robert Oltmanns and Brady Blaclmer, seeking a
declaration that Fire Insmance Exchange does not owe coverage for the claims made against Mr.
Oltmanns.

If you have any questions, please call me.
Very truly yours,
NELSON, CHIPMAN & BURT
-'I.
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